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1. Introduction 
 We consider investors who are planning to expand in electricity generation capacity market. 
Investors are anticipating regulation regarding carbon dioxide emissions in the future but do not 
know when it will be passed. Investors face large amount of  sunk costs investing in a particular 
technology, and are inclined to be risk averse towards the investments. Regulation of  the sector to 
protect the global climate seems likely at some point in the U.S., and anticipated costs are large 
relative to past regulatory interventions.  
We allow investors to anticipate different kinds of  policies, and we consider the implications 
of  their investment choices for outcomes in the presence and absence of  the anticipated regulation. 
Numerical results from a stochastic two-stage equilibrium model suggest that in the presence of  
risk aversion, some carbon instruments will introduce perverse incentives favoring investment in 
dirty generation technology. Thus the choice between grandfathering and auctioning permits has 
implications for efficiency and costs, as well as the usual distributional effects. 
 Investments in generation capacity have lasting consequences for costs and emissions. The 
median coal-fired generation facility in the United States is over forty years old [1]. There are sig-
nificant fixed costs to building capacity, and switching a given plant from one fuel to another is 
usually expensive or impractical. Risk is increasingly important in this setting, and thus analyses 
that assume certainty (or the ability to switch from one stream of  annualized power plant costs to 
another at zero or low cost) can be misleading. Financial hedges in this setting are also less available 
due to difficulties in the credit markets and investor reluctance to insure firms against downside 
risks that are likely to correlate with significant economic costs and to affect most firms in this 
setting simultaneously [2; 3; 4].   
 In particular, risk averse decision makers facing uncertain regulation may make investment 
choices that lead to a persistently inefficient generation mix for the decades ahead. Reinelt and 
Keith [5] find that the ―interaction of  regulatory uncertainty with irreversible investment raises the 
social cost of  carbon abatement by as much as 50%‖ in this setting with risk neutral investors1. 
Delay can lead to investment in dirty technology in hopes that future policies will favor existing 
coal plants, or to support of  lobbying efforts designed to minimize regulation. This overinvest-
ment is socially suboptimal and may be suboptimal for business interests relative to a scenario with 
either regulation or no regulation with certainty, especially if  rent-seeking costs are high. We examine 
the effects of  incorporating risk and uncertainty and consider the implications for the broader 
policy debate and associated modeling efforts. 
 The two-stage model considers investments by two types of  firms, one building highly pol-
luting but low variable cost capacity (coal-fired plants), and the other building low polluting but 
high variable cost capacity (natural gas plants).  Our efforts focus on the changing incentives for 
each kind of  investment and are not an effort to realistically depict a single firm‘s investment 
                                                        
1 Their calculations do not allow for the possibility of  retrofits for conventional plants. 
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portfolio; given homogenous technology, allowing multiple firms to invest in both technologies 
will yield identical choices across firms, which complicates exposition without adding new insights. 
Firms with the capacity to hedge two technologies against each other will have different responses 
to regulatory uncertainty than those that cannot, but the change in price and cost ratios will work in 
the same direction for each type of  investment. The first stage decision is made in the face of  
regulatory uncertainty as to whether or not a given carbon policy will be imposed. In the second 
stage, the regulation is either imposed or not, and a short-run market equilibrium among the 
players results. Price-taking behavior is assumed throughout.   
As expected, regardless of  how the allowances are allocated in a cap and trade system, risk 
neutral firms make the same decisions in terms of  capacity and output, even though different 
allowance allocation and distribution schemes yield varying profits. Uncertain risk neutral firms 
choose an investment mix that is optimal for neither policy, maximizing the expected payoff  of  
investment strategies based on their beliefs about the likelihood of  the regulatory regime. Risk 
averse investors hedge their bets even further to reduce their losses in the ‗bad‘ outcome, which is 
regulation in the case of  a tax or auction and no regulation if  permits are grandfathered.  
 As intuition suggests, risk neutral suppliers facing possible regulation build more gas and less 
coal-fired generation capacity than in a business-as-usual (BAU) no regulation scenario, regardless 
of  what form the potential carbon regulation takes. Risk aversion complicates matters: if  allow-
ances are grandfathered risk aversion increases investment in coal – which pays off  in the bad, 
unregulated state – and decreases it in gas relative to the risk neutral solution. If  allowances are 
auctioned, the reverse is true. This result is driven by the gains from increased distribution of  free 
permits to coal plants under grandfathering. Under our parameterizations, coal plant profits are 
higher under regulation, broadly consistent with observation of  the European Union Emissions 
Trading System [6]. In contrast, an auction or carbon tax provides a more direct signal to follow: 
firms see the rise in the expected relative price of  coal under regulatory uncertainty and the more 
risk averse they are, the more they invest in less carbon-intensive generation that will pay off  in the 
regulated state.  
This analysis focuses on firms who are uncertain about the passage of  a specific regulation. It 
seems natural as well to consider the uncertainty about the form of  eventual regulation, including 
uncertainty regarding the details of  permit allocation and distribution schemes. We have formu-
lated and solved models representing the situation in which firms are uncertain about the form of  
regulation. This limits the ability of  firms to hedge regulatory risks by adjusting investment 
strategies, and thus the effects of  risk aversion are mixed and small relative to the results presented 
here. 
 While it is difficult to observe levels of  risk aversion and risk management strategies empir-
ically (Chetty and Chetty and Szeidl [7; 8] show how consumer insurance choices, for instance, are 
insufficient to deduce levels of  consumer risk aversion, and firm insurance strategies cannot 
generally be observed to any significant degree), our results suggest that modest amounts of  
aversion to risk that are hedged via investments in durable physical capital will impact the ability of  
the U.S. power sector to meet emissions goals efficiently.  
 In most of  the literature on electricity market modeling generally as well as on carbon policy in 
particular, firm risk attitudes are not captured. Models common in this setting, e.g., NEMS [9] and 
IPM [10] are deterministic, considering a single regulatory scenario and perfect foresight. This 
reflects the extreme complexity of  these models; here we have simplified much that is important in 
policymaking to focus on the implications of  risk and uncertainty in isolation. 
 We believe this to be important; Niemayer [11] shows that older and dirtier coal plants are 
especially vulnerable to changes in carbon emissions rules over the next five to ten years, and this 
trend seems unlikely to change. Barbose [12] investigates the plans of  western utility companies 
and shows that most of  them currently make choices based on some expectation of  future carbon 
 3 
regulations. Our broader purpose is to consider the implications of  risk-fearing investors who 
make durable investments under uncertainty. 
 There is a literature on modeling capacity investment under uncertainty with risk neutral ac-
tors; Kanudia and Loulou [13] and Hu and Hobbs [14] simulate choices using the stochastic 
MARKAL model (with risk neutrality and multiple policy scenarios), and Zhuang and Gabriel [15] 
solve a similar problem as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP).  (A MCP is the problem of  
finding column vectors (X,Y) that satisfy conditions f(X,Y) ≤ 0, X ≥ 0, f(X)TX = 0, and g(X,Y) = 
0, where f( ) and g( ) are vector valued functions with the same dimensions as X and Y, respectively.)  
Fleten, Hoyland et al. [16] and Unger [17] consider optimal investment by individual risk averse 
generators facing uncertain output prices who are ‗penalized‘ for net losses. Tseng and Barz [18] 
and Liu [19] evaluate optimal operations for a company facing uncertain prices and Pati-
no-Echeverri, Morel et al. [20] studies the investment choices of  a firm facing uncertain pricing. 
This work takes price processes as exogenous, leaving aside questions of  how risk aversion might 
affect market equilibria. 
 Researchers have also studied financial hedges against risk in electricity markets. Dahlgren, Liu 
et al. [21] consider ‗financial engineering‘ and output price risk management in power markets, 
again for a single firm. Willems and Joris [22] builds on work on forward-spot market equilibria by 
Bessembinder and Lemmon [23] to evaluate financial hedges with risk aversion and varying li-
quidity constraints and degrees of  market completeness.  However, that work does not consider 
impacts on equilibrium investments in the power sector. Ralph and Smeers [24] present an initial 
attempt to do so, considering diversity of  risk attitudes among investors, while Ehrenmann and 
Smeers [25] adopt an approach related to ours. The latter paper adopts the extreme case of  mi-
nimization of  CVaR (Conditional Value-at-Risk) to represent risk aversion, and did not consider 
intermediate levels of  risk aversion (for instance by maximizing expected profit minus a weight 
times CVaR).   
 We do not model the relative merits of  various carbon policies in the broader economy as in 
Parry [26; 27], who argues for taxes over grandfathering permits on the grounds that a tax is more 
transparent and could have offsetting tax-interaction effects in other markets. Nonetheless, this 
work strengthens this conclusion by noting that anticipating a tax or auction system spurs in-
vestment in low carbon technologies while the reverse is true of  grandfathered permits. Nor do we 
allow for carbon policy to affect economy-wide allocations of  investment in technology and labor 
as in Peretto [28] – our results represent an equilibrium only in power markets. 
 This work also contributes to the established literature on the benefits of  regulatory certainty; 
even risk neutral investors in durable technology are more efficient in the certainty case, and for 
many outcomes investors and society pay higher costs under risk aversion. Bergara, Henisz et al. 
[29] analyze this in the electricity sector; see also Levy and Spiller [30], Lavey [31], Porter and van 
der Linde [32] and Porter [33], among others. 
 The paper is structured as the following: section 2 introduces the model and the methodology 
in subsections, where the mathematical model is defined, followed by an analytical and a numerical 
example; section 3 discusses more about the numerical example‘s results and we present both risk 
neutral and risk averse results; section 4 concludes. 
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2. Methods and Models 
 We consider a carbon tax scenario and two approaches to a cap and trade scheme in which 
allowances are distributed freely (based on some rule that is independent of  future investment and 
operating decisions) (―grandfathering‖), or allocated by government auction. To be specific, with a 
cap and trade rule, there will be an emissions cap for all generators in the region and all emission 
allowances are distributed or auctioned. In the tax scenario, the amount of  the tax will be equiv-
alent to the value of  emission permits derived from the cap-and-trade scenario. Firms are uncer-
tain regarding the enactment of  a given rule. We assume competitive markets and do not discuss 
demand growth or fuel price uncertainty, transmission and capacity markets, climate risk aversion, 
or consumer risk aversion in this simplified analysis.  We do include demand variability, in the form 
of  a distribution of  demand functions over the year within the second stage (e.g., peak vs baseload 
demands). This distribution is known ahead of  time to all market players, and is the reason why in 
equilibrium there is a mix of  high- and low-variable cost generation technologies in the market. 
This assumption is standard in power market modeling [34]. 
 In our model investors make initial investment decisions – whether to invest and how much - 
without knowing the state of  the world in the next stage. In the following period, in the absence of  
regulation, everything remains the same; if  there is regulation, it takes one of  several forms. 
Permits are then either grandfathered or auctioned or a tax is imposed, and the allowances can be 
traded among firms in a competitive market. 
 In the investment decision process, the investors develop a portfolio of  production plans for 
electricity production in both scenarios, given investments prior to the state of  the world being 
revealed. We first assume ‗No regulation‘ scenario cost and demand functions including demand 
variability, which is a fundamental feature of  electricity economics, resulting in the need for a mix 
of  capital-intensive baseload versus high fuel cost peaking capacity [35].  The degree of  in-
tra-annual demand variability will influence the equilibrium mix, with greater variability shifting the 
mix towards the latter. In the ‗Regulation‘ scenario, the distribution of  demand functions is un-
changed but costs reflect the addition of  equilibrium permit prices. Both the electricity price and 
the permit price are solved by market clearing conditions. Firms must make investment choices to 
maximize their utility in expectation over all regulatory scenarios. Utility is a function of  profit in 
the second stage, net of  fixed costs and summed over the demand periods. (Thus, investors are 
assumed to be risk averse only with respect to regulatory scenarios, and not the variability of  
demand within the year. This is reasonable, since hour-to-hour demand variability is predictable 
and contributes little to variability in annual net revenues, whereas regulatory uncertainty results in 
large uncertainty in annual net revenues. Ehrenmann and Smeers [25] makes the same assump-
tions). 
 Risk attitudes are modeled using a risk averse utility function as the objective function of  the 
firms. Utility is a function of  profit, and the more concave the function is, the greater the degree of  
risk aversion. That concavity results in a lower expected utility for an uncertain profit than for a 
certain profit when their expected values are identical. We consider how varying degrees of  risk 
aversion affect the equilibrium results by changing the Arrow-Pratt coefficient in a Constant 
Absolute Risk Averse (CARA) utility function given by: 
          (1) 
Firms thus have a constant absolute risk aversion (R) in total profit (π).  A larger R indicates that 
the agent is more risk averse. The extreme case of  risk neutrality can be modeled by directly using 
expected profit as the objective. Both m and n in (1) are set to 1 for simplicity in our model, and do 
not affect the solutions. 
 Suppliers maximize expected utility under a set of  constraints; consumers maximize consumer 
surplus in each demand period in the second stage; and the markets for energy and allowances clear. 
( ) , 0, 0RU m n e for n R
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The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for each market player‘s optimization problem to-
gether with the market clearing conditions define an equilibrium problem expressed as a mixed 
complementarity problem [36]. This allows for flexibility in the form and interaction of  the con-
straints and is common in modeling for this policy setting [34; 37]. We use the PATH solver in 
GAMS to find equilibria under various assumptions. 
2.1 Model Definition 
 Initially, we summarize the formulation of  the model with two risk averse firms.2 The sets, 
parameters, variables and equations used in the model are shown in Table 1.  The model simulates 
the firms‘ investment problem when they face uncertainty in the carbon policy scheme: either there 
will be no regulation in the next stage (with probability PRnreg), or a cap and trade carbon emission 
permit scheme (with probability PRreg = 1-PRnreg).
3 
For firms: 
For the firm using fuel k, annualized profit in scenario i is defined as πik: 
      (2) 
Risk neutral firms maximize expected profit πk, and risk averse firms maximize expected utility Uk 
where the utility function Uik is defined according to equation (1): 
 (for risk neutral firms)          (3) 
  (for risk averse firms)     (4) 
        (5) 
       (6) 
This model format is flexible in the sense that when the allowances are auctioned,  = 0. Any 
rule that distributes free allowances to firms in a manner that is independent of  the firms‘ decisions 
can be modeled by adjusting this parameter.    
The KKT conditions associated with risk averse firms are as follows.  (The symbol  means 
that the two conditions are orthogonal, i.e., 0 < x  f(x) < 0 is equivalent to 0 < x ,  f(x) < 0, and x 
× f(x) = 0.)  
,0 ( ) 0 , ,
ikR e
ijk i j ij ik ijk i k j reg kq R PR e HR p MC Z E HR i j k  (7) 
  (8) 
 
(9)
 
 
(10)
 
  (11) 
                                                        
2 For convenience, we set up the problem with a gas-fired firm and a coal-fired firm; allowing firms to have a mixture of  technology 
would not change the nature of  the results. 
3 We do not show the case of  a carbon tax here, but the basic model formulation would change little.  In the tax case, the price for 
the carbon emission is the tax (TAXi) itself, instead of  the carbon price (pcreg) generated from the cap-and-trade system, as in the 
cap-and-trade‘s scenario. 
,( )
e c
ik j ijk ij ik k k i reg reg k
j
HR q p MC CC cap Z p emit
k i ik
i
Max PR
1 ik
R
k i ik i
i i
Max U PR U PR e
. . 0 , , ( )ijk k ijks t q cap i j k
, , ,( )
gf
k j reg jk reg k k reg k
j
E HR q emit E
gf
kE
,
0 ( ) 0ik
R
k i k ijk
i i j
cap PR R e CC k
,
, ,0 0
reg kR c
reg k reg reg reg kemit PR R e p k
0 0 , ,ijk ijk kq cap i j k
, , ,0 0
gf
reg k k j reg jk k reg k
j
E HR q E emit k
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Consumers maximize their surplus CSi: 
21[( ) ]
2
ij e
i j ij ij ij ij ij
j ij
Max CS HR d d p d         (12) 
              (13) 
The consumers‘ KKT conditions are: 
0 0 ,
ij e
ij ij ij ij
ij
d d p i j          (14) 
The market clearing conditions for energy and emissions are, respectively: 
         (15) 
        (16) 
 
2.2 Analytical Results 
In this section, we show that under certain conditions, market equilibrium prices, emissions, 
and generation mix are invariant with respect to the allowance distribution and allocation scheme 
or tax, if  firms are risk neutral. Subsequent numerical results show that this does not hold under 
risk aversion.  
Three policy environments are considered: 
i. Cap and trade policy with auctioned allowances; 
ii. Cap and trade policy with free allowances, with a fixed number of  grandfathered (i.e., 
distributed independently of  the firm‘s decisions) permits; 
iii. Carbon tax, where the tax is exogenously set to the allowance price obtained from the 
auction-based allowance trading model (i). 
[Proposition 1] For risk neutral firms in a competitive electricity market, under a 
fixed emission cap that is binding: (i) and (ii) yield the same values for investment 
and operation of  the plant. For risk neutral firms any permit equilibrium (i) is a tax 
equilibrium (iii) 4. 
First we develop the equilibrium conditions for risk neutral operators who either buy auc-
tioned allowances, are given a fixed number of  allowances for free, or some combination of  the 
two approaches. We then derive the first order conditions for an equivalent carbon tax model. 
When we model risk averse firms, the former equivalence no longer holds. Nevertheless, we can 
show certain equivalences between the model with auctioned emission permits (model (i)) and an 
equivalent carbon tax model (model (iii)). The proof  is below. 
Proof  of  Proposition 1: Firstly, the existence of  an equilibrium is guaranteed for models (i), 
(ii) and (iii), if, (a): the strategy set is non-empty, convex and compact; and (b): the utility function is 
quasi concave [45]. The games satisfy the two conditions: first, an equilibrium will never have more 
capacity than the peak demand under zero price, otherwise there would be unused capacity and its 
owner could increase profit by not building that capacity. Consequently, our decision variables have 
a lower and upper bound, and thus the strategy set satisfies condition (a). Second, our utility 
function, the exponential function of  profit, is a concave utility function, satisfying (b). 
                                                        
4 The existence of  the Nash Equilibrium is shown in the proof  for proposition 1. 
. . 0 ,ijs t d i j
, ( )
ij
e
ijk ij
k
q d i j p
,
,
( )cap ck j reg jk reg
j k
E HR q E p
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Part I: Equivalence of  (i) and (ii) in investment, energy demand, and prices.   
If  the price of  emissions is positive (otherwise the overall equilibrium problem is trivial), the 
emission constraint for firms (equation (6)) will hold as an equality (By contradiction, if  it held as a 
strict inequality while the emissions price was positive, then the firm could increase profit by de-
creasing emitreg,k without affecting any other decision.): 
, , ,( )
gf
k j reg jk reg k k reg k
j
E HR q emit E         (17) 
Simplify the model by substituting emitreg,k into the objective (3), then the objective and constraints 
(originally equations (3), (5) and (6)) for firms in model (i) and (ii) become: 
,
[ ( )
( )]
ij
e
k i j ijk ik k k
i j
c gf
i reg k j reg jk k
j
Max PR HR q p MC CC cap
Z p E HR q E
      , (18) 
plus constraint (5). The associated KKT conditions are: 
0 ( ) 0 , ,
ij
e c
ijk i j ik i k reg ijkq PR HR p MC Z E p i j k     (19) 
,
0 0k k ijk
i j
cap CC k      (20) 
plus condition (10).  The consumer‘s condition and market clearing conditions (14)-(16) remain the 
same. 
 The resulting equilibrium problem ((10), (14)-(16), (19), (20)) is independent of  Egfk, so the 
decision variables of  capacity, energy output, and quantity demanded (as well as prices) are not a 
function of  Egfk. Thus, if  the allowances are totally grandfathered ( E
gf = Ecap ), or auctioned ( Egf = 
0), or distributed by another allocation rule, the solutions do not change and models (i) and (ii) yield 
the same generator decisions and market prices. Other variables, including the permit purchases 
emitreg,k and consequent profits for firms in different scenarios, differ. 
Part II: Equivalence of  (i) and (iii).  The tax model (iii) is based upon this definition of  firm profit: 
( )
ij
e
ik j ijk ik i k k k
j
HR q p MC TAX E CC cap         (21) 
where the TAXi is assumed to equal 0 under scenario i = nreg while equaling 
e
regp  from models (i) 
and (ii) if  i = reg.  In the risk neutral case, firms‘ objective and constraint are: 
[ ( ) ]
ij
e
k i j ijk ik i k k k
i j
Max PR HR q p MC TAX E CC cap  ,   (22) 
plus constraint (5).
 
The KKT condition with regard to the plant output variables then becomes: 
0 ( ) 0 , ,
ij
e
ijk i j ik i k ijkq PR HR p MC TAX E i j k        (23) 
The overall equilibrium problem ((10), (14), (15), (20), (23)) consists of  condition (23) plus con-
ditions (20) and (10) for firms, (14) for consumers, and (15) for energy market clearing, as in 
models (i) and (ii).  Condition (16), market clearing for emissions, is omitted because we instead 
assume an exogenous tax. 
 Thus, models (i), (ii) and (iii) are comprised of  the same sets of  conditions except for one of  
the firms‘ condition (equation (19) vs. equation (23)); in addition, model (i) and (ii) have one more 
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market clearing condition than model (iii) (equation (16)). Thus, if  we show the equivalence of  
equations (19) and (23), we show that all model (i) and (ii) solutions are a subset of  the solutions to 
model (iii).  To show the equivalence of  (19) and (23), it is sufficient to show the following equation 
holds: 
c
i j k i i j i k regPR HR E TAX PR HR Z E p           (24) 
This is true by assumption: when the realized scenario is ‗No regulation‘ (i.e., Znreg = 0, and TAXnreg 
= 0), then (24) is satisfied trivially; when the scenario is ‗Regulation‘, (24) holds since Zreg = 1 and 
the tax equals the permit price. 
 Therefore, model (i) and (ii)‘s solutions are a subset of  model (iii)‘s solution. The emissions 
permit models (i) and (ii)‘s solution also satisfy the conditions for the tax model (iii) (but not 
necessarily the other way, if  there are multiple equilibria for model (iii)) because the latter‘s equi-
librium conditions are a subset of  the formers‘.) Additionally, if  the solution for model (iii) is 
unique, then model (i), (ii) and model (iii) are equivalent, yielding the same decision variables, prices, 
and surpluses for all market participants. This completes the proof. 
[Proposition 2]: Assume risk averse firms in a competitive market. Consider 
models (i), with auctioned permits, and (iii) with an equivalent carbon tax. Then 
the risk averse market equilibrium solutions for model (i) are a subset of  the so-
lution set for model (iii) in terms of  the decision variables and prices, and the 
solutions are identical when model (iii) has a unique equilibrium.  
This proposition can be viewed as a generalization of  that proved in Newell, Pizer et al. [38] to 
the case of  risk aversion in firms. We show that model (i) generates equilibria in terms of  decision 
variables and prices which are a subset of  model (iii)‘s decision variable and price solution set.  
Proof  of  Proposition 2: Model (i) is formulated by equations (4)-(6).  Assuming, as in 
Proposition 1, that the firms emissions permit trading constraint (6) holds as an equality, then for 
model (i), the profit is defined as in (18) plus setting gfkE =0, i.e.: 
( )e cik j ijk ij ik i reg k k k
j
HR q p MC Z p E CC cap         (25) 
The risk averse firms‘ problem reduces to (4) and (5) and the KKT conditions are: 
0 ( ) 0 , ,ik
R e c
ijk i j ij ik i reg k ijkq PR R HR e p MC Z p E i j k     (26) 
plus conditions (8) and (10) for firms, (14) for consumers, and the two market clearing conditions 
(15) and (16). Equilibrium is defined as ((8), (10), (14), (15), (16), (26)). 
 Meanwhile, model (iii) has profit formulated as in (21), objective (4) and constraint (5). So the 
equilibrium conditions associated with model (iii) are: 
0 ( ) 0 , ,ik
R e
ijk i j ij ik i k ijkq PR R HR e p MC TAX E i j k      (27) 
plus firms‘ conditions (8) and (10), consumer condition (14), and the energy market clearing 
condition (15). Equilibrium is defined as ((8), (10), (14), (15), (27)). 
 First note the equivalence of  (26) and (27).  This follows from our assumption that the al-
lowance price in the tax model (iii) is set to the level that would occur in the auctioned permits 
model (i), as in Proposition 1.  Since all the other equilibrium conditions of  model (iii) are also in 
model (i) while model (i) has one more market clearing condition (16) than model (iii), then any 
solution to model (i) will also satisfy the equilibrium conditions in (iii). Further, if  model (iii) does 
not have multiple solutions, models (i) and (iii) are equivalent and this completes the proof. 
 Under the assumption of  risk neutrality, different allowance allocation and distribution 
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schemes generate the same capacity and operational strategies, although firms realize different 
profits under different schemes. This is because the specific scheme determines how rents are 
allocated, but does not change the marginal costs and benefits of  investments. Under risk aversion, 
investors‘ strategies are sensitive to the amount of  economic rents they will receive – as shown in 
the propositions, the rent affects the marginal utility of  profit for risk averse investors– and thus 
grandfathering or auctioning permits provides very different incentives. Since solutions under risk 
aversion are less tractable analytically, we examine them computationally. We do not consider the 
tax scenario separately below, since the auction yields identical results. 
2.3 Computational Application 
To illustrate how firms with different risk attitudes will invest in the settings defined above, 
consider a single power market with the following characteristics (fuller details of  the parameters 
are shown in Table 1; market demand parameters are shown in the appendix):  
We assume equal probability for the future scenarios: a given rule under cap-and-trade policy is 
realized or not. There are two firms investing in the market; one a coal-fired plant investor and the 
other a gas-turbine investor. They face a deterministic inverse demand function as in equation (28) 
in appendix 1, which reflects peak and off-peak demands for 24 periods over a one-year horizon 
(8760 hours). The coal-fired plant has higher capital costs (140,000$/MW/yr) but lower variable 
costs (40$/MWh, variable costs exclusive of  carbon permit costs); the gas-turbine has lower capital 
costs (80,000$/MW/yr) but higher variable costs (65$/MWh). However, the coal plant has high 
CO2 emissions (1 tons/MWh) compared to the gas plant (0.5 tons/MWh)
5. If  emissions are re-
gulated, then the government will set an emission cap at 80% of  the BAU baseline. 
We model two methods for distribution of  initial permits under grandfathering which assigns 
allowances based on existing capacity (rule I6), or existing generation (rule II5). Under both rules, 
the free allowance amounts are exogenous to choices made by firms in the stochastic market 
equilibria, so this is a true grandfathering scheme, not an updating scheme. In our parameterization, 
rule II gives relatively more allowances to coal-fired plant than rule I: the gas firm is granted 0.53 
million tons/yr emission allowances and the coal firm is granted 8.63 million tons/yr. In contrast, 
rule I grants 4.14 million tons/yr to the gas plant and 5.02 million tons/yr to the coal plant. The 
firms‘ utility function is equation (1). 
 As shown above, the initial distribution rule will not affect the risk neutral firms‘ investment 
and operating decisions nor market prices, but for risk averse firms, it might. To analyze the impact 
of  risk aversion in more details, we present deterministic and stochastic equilibrium models; in the 
former we solve for ‗No regulation‘ with certainty outcomes and regulation with certainty out-
comes, and in the latter consider how increasing levels of  risk aversion affect outcomes when a 
regulation may or may not be implemented in the next period. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 The assumptions reflect current literatures for policy models of  the energy sector (or broader). We have investigated reports (e.g., 
from International Energy Agency (IEA) [39] and [40]); as well as several peer-reviewed articles (e.g., Odenberger, Unger et al. [41] 
and Schwarz [42], etc.) We believe our assumptions fall reasonably in the range of  the up-to-date modeling assumptions for this 
sector. 
6 Mathematically, under rule I, the allocated emission for firm k is: ;  
under rule II,  , where cap0k, q0jk indicates the capacity/output decisions as solved from the BAU 
case (please refer to table 1 for notation details). 
 10 
Table 1. Model definitions 
 
3. Model Solutions and Discussion 
A few key results are summarized in Table 2. Tables 3 through 5 show fuller solutions for the 
cap and trade scheme – Table 3 shows model solutions where emission allowances are auctioned; 
Tables 4 and 5 show solutions where emission allowances are grandfathered.  
3.1. Uncertainty and risk neutrality 
Initially we solve for the market‘s baseline emission level, the ‗Deterministic no regulation‘ 
solution; we define the emissions cap as 80% of  that level.7 This baseline case corresponds to 
Column 1, Table 2 and Column 2 from Tables 3 through 5. At baseline, the gas plant installs 1890 
MW capacity, the coal plant installs 1146 MW and together they serve demand ranging from 
595-3036 MW. The gas plant operates at full capacity (1890 MW) in peak demand periods and 
shuts down when demand is low, because gas-turbine generated power has higher marginal costs. 
The coal plant runs at full capacity (1146 MW) for the peak, and provides all the power when 
demand is less than or equal to its capacity. With the emission factors we assumed, the gas plant 
emits 0.5 million tons/yr CO2 (=∑j qnreg,j,g MW * HRj hrs/yr * 0.5 ton/MWh). Similarly, the coal 
plant emits 8.6 million tons/yr CO2 (=∑j qnreg,,j,c MW * HRj hrs/yr * 1 ton/MWh). Thus, the total 
CO2 emission baseline is 9.1 million tons/yr. 
 If  regulation is certain (Column 2, Table 2 and Column 3, Tables 3-5), investment in gas 
                                                        
7 The results shown are all for a 20% reduction in emissions; we also performed the analysis for a 50% reduction, with results 
showing similar trends but, as would be expected, of  greater magnitude. These are available from the authors upon request, but are 
not reported as we feel that the 20% results are more relevant to the current policy discourse. Risk aversion with regards to fixed 
capital investments should reflect the expected regulatory timeline, and a 20% reduction within the lifetime of  a new power plant is 
certainly plausible in the United States at present. 
 Sets Parameters
i
Scenario indicator, denoted as ‗reg ‘ for ‗Regulation‘ 
and ‗nreg ‘ for ‗No regulation‘. Φ ij , Ψ ij
Parameters for the linear demand 
function in scenario i , period j .
j
Time period indicator within a scenario of the year, 
representing levels of demand (e.g., peak vs. 
baseload). CC k
Annualized capacity cost for the 
firm k ($/MW/yr).
k
Generation fuel/firm type indicator (natural gas or 
coal-fired firm), denoted as ‗g ‘ and ‗c ‘, respectively. MC ik
Variable cost for the firm k in 
scenario i ($/MWh).
Decision Variables PR i Probability of being in scenario i.
d ij
Quantity of electricity demanded in scenario i , 
demand period j  of stage two (MW). HR j Hours in period j (hrs/yr).
q ijk
Quantity of energy supplied in scenario i , period j 
by the firm using fuel k  (MW). E k
Emission rate of fuel/firm k 
(tons/MWh).
cap k Capacity constructed for firm k (MW). E
cap
Emission cap for the entire 
market (tons/yr).
emit reg,k
Net emission permit purchase if i=reg by the firm
using fuel k (tons/yr). E
gf
Total grandfathered allowances in 
the market (tons/yr).
Lagrange multipliers E gf k
Grandfathered allowances 
allocated to firm k (tons/yr).
μ ijk
Lagrange multiplier for the capacity constraint for 
firm k  in scenario i , period j ($/MW/yr). TAX i
Exogenous tax in scenario i in the 
emissions tax model ($/ton).
p
e
ij
Market clearing electricity price in scenario i , 
period j ($/MWh). Z i
Scenario indicator. Z i  = 1, if i  = 
reg  and Z i  = 0 if i =  nreg.
λ reg,k
Lagrange multiplier for the emission constraint for 
firm k  ($/ton). R
Arrow-Pratt risk aversion 
coefficient.
p
c
reg
Equilibrium emission permit price under the reg 
scenario ($/ton).
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generation increases and coal decreases, with an equilibrium installed capacity of  2329 MW and 
608 MW, respectively. Emissions intensity falls 17%, and total CO2 emissions fall to 7.3 million 
tons/year. Total quantity of  power supplied drops by about 4% relative to the baseline as prices rise. 
As shown in Proposition 1, these results do not depend on the specific form of  regulation. 
 For risk neutral suppliers, shown in Columns 3-4 of  Table 2 and Column 4 of  Tables 3-5, 
compared to the baseline, if  investors are certain the regulation will be implemented, the gas plant 
increases its capacity and investments in coal-fired capacity decline. If  regulation is uncertain, both 
changes are moderated. This finding is consistent with our intuition regarding uncertainty and 
holds for regulations that impose a permit auction and for those that grandfather permits. 
 As this is a long run equilibrium problem without scale economies, risk neutral firms realize 
zero expected profits in the auction model. Thus, when the emissions cap is 80% of  the baseline 
emissions, in the auction case, the gas firm sees a profit of  4.9 million $/yr in the ‗No regulation‘ 
scenario and -4.9 million $/yr in the ‗Regulation‘ scenario; the coal firm sees a profit of  62.0 million 
$/yr in the unregulated scenario and -62.0 million $/yr in the regulated scenario. Both lose money 
under regulation, as power prices rise insufficiently to cover the cost of  allowances. 
 However, when the government allocates allowances for free to risk neutral firms, expected 
profits are positive and equal to the value of  the free allowances. The gas firm earns 4.9 and 16.4 
million $/yr in the ‗No regulation‘ and ‗Regulation‘ scenario, respectively; the coal company earns 
$62 million in the ‗No regulation‘ scenario and $283 million in the ‗Regulation‘ scenario. The total 
expected profit of  the two plants is thus $183 million. The total expected economic rent associated 
with the free allowances is also 183 million $/yr (=7.3 million ton/yr * 50$/ton * 0.5, with 0.5 the 
probability of  being in regulation). Both firms earn more under regulation because each receives 
valuable allowances for free, even though total electricity sales across the two firms fall due to 
higher energy prices, which arise because the opportunity cost of  allowances is partially passed 
through to the consumer. (Indeed, this was the experience in the EU after the implementation of  
CO2 trading in 2005, see [6]).  
 Since regardless of  how allowances are distributed, risk neutral firms facing the same emis-
sions cap make the same investment and operating decisions, the same quantities supplied and 
power prices emerge in equilibrium. With emissions capped at 80% of  the baseline, risk neutral 
firms facing regulatory uncertainty make the following choices: the gas firm builds 1973 MW 
capacity and the coal firm builds 992 MW. The demand weighted power price is 82 $/MWh if  the 
regulation is not implemented and 115 $/MWh if  it is. However, there are differences in the net 
permits purchased by each firm and their individual profits under regulation for alternative al-
lowance distribution schemes. Thus, the coal firm makes a loss under regulation with auctioned 
permits, but earns profits if  allowances are grandfathered. This difference in profits affects the 
equilibrium investments and prices for risk averse investors. 
3.2. Adding risk aversion 
In contrast, when firms are risk averse, how emission allowances will be managed affects in-
vestment choices under uncertainty, as shown in Columns 5-6 of  Table 2. When all allowances are 
auctioned, risk averse firms build more (relatively clean) gas capacity and less (relatively dirty) coal 
capacity than risk neutral firms. This trend intensifies as risk aversion increases (Figure 1 and Table 
3). The reverse happens if  allowances are grandfathered under either of  the proposed rules 
(Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 4 and 5)—the gas firm builds less capacity and the coal plant more. 
This is because the relatively carbon intensive coal plant will receive more of  the rents associated 
with free permits than the gas plant, making it more attractive in the event of  regulation. Thus, the 
effect of  risk aversion is ambiguous, interacting with the choice of  how allowances are allocated.  
While the focus of  political debate over whether allowances should be granted freely or auctioned 
has been on who gets the resulting economic rents, if  risk aversion matters, there are also impli-
cations for generation mix, costs, and emissions.  
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Figure 18: Effect of  risk aversion on capacity decisions, auctioned allowances,  
80% emission cap, equal scenario probability 
 
 
Figure 2: Effect of  risk aversion on capacity decisions, grandfathered emission allowances,  
allocation rule II, 80% emission cap, equal scenario probability 
 
 
The intuition behind the observed interaction between risk aversion and investment choices is 
as follows. A risk averse actor puts more relative weight on the ‗bad‘ (less profitable) scenarios in 
the decision process. The greater the degree of  risk aversion, the more weight placed on that bad 
scenario and, as a result, the more the firm‘s investment choice will resemble the decision made if  
that ‗bad‘ scenario is certain. This trend is shown by the arrows in Figures 1-3. Which scenario will 
be the ‗bad‘ scenario will depend on the specific policy considered. If  emission permits are 
grandfathered, firms receive a ‗free‘ asset and profits are higher than under ‗No regulation‘. Thus, 
risk aversion moves firms‘ decisions towards the less profitable, deterministic ‗No regulation‘ case 
– increasing coal capacity. However, when allowances are auctioned, the government is allocated 
                                                        
8 Numbers in figure 1-3 refer to risk aversion coefficients; 1e-9 reflects the mildest level of  risk aversion and 1e-8 the highest level 
shown. 
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the new asset instead of  firms, and the cost of  production is increased under regulation, making 
the regulated scenario the ‗bad‘ one. As energy prices do not increase enough to compensate, firms 
are worse off  under regulation with auctioned permits, and they hedge against that eventuality in 
their capacity expansion choices by investing in the relatively clean gas-turbine technology. 
 
Figure 3: Effect of  risk aversion on capacity decisions, grandfathered emission allowances,  
allocation rule I, 80% emission cap, equal scenario probability 
 
 
This partly explains why under grandfathering, greater risk aversion actually increases the total 
amount of  investment. The reason is that increased risk aversion, as noted above, causes individual 
investors to shift their investments closer to what would occur in the less profitable of  the two 
deterministic scenarios.  Under rule I, this is the ―No regulation‖ scenario, which has more total 
capacity. 
Babcock, Choi et al. [43] discuss the difficulty of  interpreting (or providing intuition for) the 
degree of  risk aversion based on the CARA coefficient. Bickel and Smith [44] finds that financial 
stress and the cost of  liquidity do not drive high levels of  risk aversion in firms. However, the 
implicit weights placed on the ‗bad‘ outcome by investors under the given scenarios do not seem 
unreasonable.  
 For example, in the auction setting, the gas firm with a risk aversion coefficient of  5 10-9 
(Column 6, Table 3) makes decisions equivalent to putting a weight of  49% on the ‗No regulation‘ 
(good) scenario and 51% on the ‗Regulation‘ (bad) scenario. With allowances grandfathered using 
the emissions rule, the gas firm with R = 5 10-9 (Table 4, Column 6) puts 51.2% implicit weight on 
the ‗No regulation‘ (bad) scenario and 48.8% on the ‗Regulation‘ (good) scenario. The coal plant 
puts an implicit weight of  65% on ‗No regulation‘ and 35% on ‗Regulation.‘ As risk aversion in-
creases, the gas firm‘s implicit weight for the ‗bad‘ scenario rises from 51.2% to 51.6% and the coal 
firm‘s from 65% to 76.7%. 
 The permit market is competitive, so the permit price equals the marginal cost of  control. In 
this case, this is the cost of  reducing emissions by one additional ton by switching from coal to gas 
generation. In Table 4 Column 6 (the middle parameterization of  risk aversion), the permit price is 
50$/ton. If  an emissions reduction was achieved by lowering demand, that could reflect a slight 
price increase in the last (lowest demand) period. The price at that time is $90/MWh, and the 
marginal fuel is coal, which costs $40/MWh; so the loss of  willingness-to-pay (net of  fuel savings) 
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is $50/MWh, which equals the price of  emissions allowances (cost per ton emission reduction, i.e., 
$50/MWh/1ton/MWh = $50/ton). This allowance price is also consistent with a pure supply-side 
emissions reduction strategy of  substituting gas for coal: reducing emissions by one ton under a 
constant quantity demanded would be accomplished by increasing gas generation by two MWh 
and lowering generation by coal by an equal amount, lowering emissions by 2 MWh*(1 - 0.5 
tons/MWh) = 1 ton.  This would increase fuel costs by 2 MWh*(65 $/MWh – 40 $/MWh) = $50, 
again equal to the allowance price. 
 The equilibrium energy price (demand weighted) in the ‗No regulation‘ scenario rises with 
increasing risk aversion when allowances are auctioned, but drops with increasing risk aversion 
when allowances are grandfathered. (Note, however, that unregulated prices are always lower than 
prices under regulation). These trends in unregulated prices arise because risk aversion results in 
increased investment in cleaner, higher marginal cost capacity when investors anticipate an auction 
scheme; consequently, if  regulation does not materialize, this costly capacity is marginal in more 
hours, resulting in higher prices. In contrast, the greater amount of  dirty, low marginal cost 
technology built by investors fearing the absence of  a lucrative grandfathering program results in 
this capacity providing the marginal unit of  power in more hours in the no regulation scenario, 
lowering average prices. For the relatively mild emissions reduction shown here, the permit price is 
not very sensitive to either risk attitudes or emission allocation rules. Figures 1-3 show capacity 
decisions under different levels of  risk aversion in investors facing an 80% cap implemented by 
permit auction or grandfathering. 
 The change in capacity mix due to risk aversion affects not only expected costs in the sto-
chastic equilibria, but also realized emissions in the ‗No regulation‘ scenario in those equilibria. 
(Emissions in the regulated scenario are unaffected by definition since the same cap is assumed for 
all regulated cases). In the stochastic equilibrium under risk neutrality with auctioned allowances, 
realized ‗No regulation‘ emissions are 96% of  the emissions at the deterministic baseline; as risk 
aversion is introduced and increased, unregulated emissions drop to between 81 and 95% of  the 
base case. The reverse is true under grandfathering; as risk aversion increases, the installed capacity 
mix becomes dirtier, and so emissions in the absence of  a policy increase relative to the risk neutral 
case. Emissions under risk aversion with the generation rule (rule II) range from 97 to ~100% of  
baseline emissions when the anticipated policy is not realized in the second stage; the range is from 
97 to 99% under the capacity rule (rule I). Thus, the interaction of  risk aversion and allowance 
distribution via grandfathering or auction has not only cost implications but also emissions effects 
in the period prior to implementation of  a policy program, though the exact allocation rule for 
grandfathered allowances has relatively small impacts in the parameterization used here. 
Ongoing work is needed to determine how risk aversion might be incorporated in large-scale 
policy models. One extension would be to consider multiple decision stages for investments, which 
would allow for both the option of  delaying investment until regulatory uncertainties are at least 
partially resolved, and for later adjustments in capacity.  Although computational challenges make 
this work beyond the scope of  the current paper, we hypothesize that the irreversibility of  capacity 
investment would still imply that increased risk aversion would bias firms towards optimal in-
vestments under the least profitable scenarios. Defensible heuristics or efforts to estimate the 
degree of  risk aversion empirically might strengthen future modeling efforts. Further, this work 
abstracts from known important features of  the policy setting, including market power, renewable 
portfolio standards, and engineering risks related to grid reliability. A more detailed specification of  
the plant itself  could enable consideration of  plant lifecycles and scale effects in technology – this 
would ideally include the dynamics of  investment choices when the investor already owns hete-
rogenous capital stock for electricity generation; the choice of  when to retire old capital so as to 
delay decision making under uncertainty is likely to be important in this setting. 
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4. Conclusions 
For risk averse generators, capacity and cost outcomes are sensitive to the distribution and 
allocation scheme for allowances, since this determines whether the ‗Regulation‘ or ‗No regulation‘ 
scenario is more profitable. While risk neutral firms will make the same investment decision in 
terms of  decision variables (capacities, supplies, prices, demands), regardless of  how the emission 
allowances are treated (grandfathered or auctioned) and which rule is applied in the grandfathering 
case, risk averse firms will not: if  carbon is taxed or allowances are auctioned, investment in clean 
generation increases with the degree of  risk aversion as firms self-insure against the possibility of  
costly regulation. On the other hand, if  allowances are allocated to producers for free, investment 
in dirty generation rises relative to the risk-neutral case and, under our parameterizations, ap-
proaches the level expected under the guaranteed ‗No regulation‘ scenario. Risk averse generators 
position themselves to hedge against the possibility that lucrative regulation will not be imple-
mented in the next period. 
 With risk aversion, emissions in the ‗No regulation‘ scenario are lower for auctioned permits 
and higher with grandfathering. Consumer prices under regulation are not very sensitive to dis-
tribution/allocation of  permits in the regulated scenario; however, if  the proposed regulation is 
not implemented, consumer prices rise with risk aversion if  an auction is anticipated and fall if  
grandfathering is anticipated. Complete social welfare calculations are not possible without valuing 
avoided climate damages (and damages associated with other pollutants for each technology), but 
these results imply losses of  productive and allocative efficiency in power markets. 
The magnitude of  the effect of  risk aversion on the equilibrium generation mix will, of  course, 
depend on assumptions concerning the available types of  generation and their characteristics.  We 
have considered the two most popular types of  generation capacity installed in the last twenty years 
in the US; in other simulations, not shown here for the sake of  brevity, we have also included 
renewable generation.  The same trend occurs: risk aversion pushes each market party‘s invest-
ments in the direction of  the scenario that is least profitable. Other assumptions might result in 
larger or smaller effects, but we anticipate the same qualitative results. 
 Our finding has policy implications: distribution schemes do not just determine who gets rents 
from creating emissions rights. The kind of  regulatory framework that industry anticipates will 
affect their choices in potentially perverse ways. Additionally, if  political considerations make 
regulators unable or unwilling to impose carbon dioxide restrictions without helping dirty sectors, 
it might be preferable to find ways to rebate the funds raised from an auction in ways that do not 
encourage carbon-intensive generation investment. More generally, we find that a failure to con-
sider risk and risk aversion may bias models of  this sector and others, especially where durable 
capital investments limit adjustment options.  
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Table 2: Summary of  key results   
 
 
 
*: Risk averse results are for the middle parameterization of risk; Column 6 in subsequent tables. 
**: Baseline solutions are presented and are independent of policy schemes listed in the left. 
 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6
Baseline** Regulation
No 
Regulation 
Scenario
Regulation 
Scenario
No Regulation 
Scenario
Regulation 
Scenario
Auction 2329 1973 1973 2201 2201
GF (Allocation Rule II) 2329 1973 1973 1850 1850
GF (Allocation Rule I) 2329 1973 1973 1941 1941
Auction 608 992 992 763 763
GF (Allocation Rule II) 608 992 992 1118 1118
GF (Allocation Rule I) 608 992 992 1051 1051
Auction 107 82 115 88 115
GF (Allocation Rule II) 107 82 115 77 115
GF (Allocation Rule I) 107 82 115 80 115
Auction 4.1 1.6 3.9 3.0 3.9
GF (Allocation Rule II) 4.1 1.6 3.9 1.1 3.9
GF (Allocation Rule I) 4.1 1.6 3.9 1.3 3.9
Auction 5.4 8.0 5.4 6.6 5.4
GF (Allocation Rule II) 5.4 8.0 5.4 8.5 5.4
GF (Allocation Rule I) 5.4 8.0 5.4 8.3 5.4
Auction 2.0 0.79 2.0 1.5 2.0
GF (Allocation Rule II) 2.0 0.79 2.0 0.56 2.0
GF (Allocation Rule I) 2.0 0.79 2.0 0.67 2.0
Auction 5.3 8.0 5.4 6.6 5.4
GF (Allocation Rule II) 5.3 8.0 5.4 8.5 5.4
GF (Allocation Rule I) 5.3 8.0 5.4 8.3 5.4
Auction 35 -- 50 -- 50
GF (Allocation Rule II) 35 -- 50 -- 50
GF (Allocation Rule I) 35 -- 50 -- 50
Auction 0.0 4.9 -4.9 5.7 -5.4
GF (Allocation Rule II) 14.9 4.9 16.4 4.5 16.6
GF (Allocation Rule I) 116.0 4.9 161.0 3.1 159.0
Auction 0.0 62.0 -62.0 99.2 -47.6
GF (Allocation Rule II) 242.0 62.0 283.0 19.5 275.0
GF (Allocation Rule I) 141.0 62.0 139.0 42.0 134.0
Auction 0.79 0.92 0.79 0.84 0.79
GF (Allocation Rule II) 0.79 0.92 0.79 0.94 0.79
GF (Allocation Rule I) 0.79 0.92 0.79 0.93 0.79
Auction 107.3 75.0 122.0 77.5 120.5
GF (Allocation Rule II) 79.8 75.0 82.5 74.4 83.3
GF (Allocation Rule I) 79.8 75.0 82.5 74.8 83.1
Auction 78.1 44.1 90.0 47.9 90.0
GF (Allocation Rule II) 50.7 44.1 50.6 42.9 50.6
GF (Allocation Rule I) 50.7 44.1 50.6 43.5 50.6
Auction 29.2 30.9 31.9 29.6 30.4
GF (Allocation Rule II) 29.2 30.9 31.9 31.5 32.8
GF (Allocation Rule I) 29.2 30.9 31.9 31.4 32.6
0.0
0.0
0.95
74.9
42.7
32.2
75
1.1
8.6
0.53
8.6
--
Deterministic Equilibria Stochastic - Risk Neutral Stochastic - Risk Averse*
Gas Firm Capacity 
(MW)
1890
1146
Coal Firm 
Capacity (MW)
Demand Weighted 
Price ($/MWh)
Gas Firm Total 
Quantity Supplied 
(Million MWh)
Average 
Generation Cost 
($/MWh)
Coal Firm Total 
Quantity Supplied 
(Million MWh)
Gas Firm Total 
Emission        
(Million Ton/yr)
Coal Firm Total 
Emission    
(Million Ton/yr)
CO2 Permit Price 
($/Ton)
Average Variable 
Generation Cost 
($/MWh)
Average Fixed 
Generation Cost 
($/MWh)
Gas Firm Profit 
(Million $/yr)
Coal Firm Profit 
(Million $/yr)
Total Emission per 
Output 
(Tons/MWh/yr)
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Table 3: Example of  solutions found with 80% emission cap,  
auctioned allowances in a competitive market 
 
 
 
 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7
Regulation Environment/Risk Attitude Baseline Regulation Neutral 1x10
-9
5x10
-9
1x10
-8
Gas Firm Capacity (MW) 1890 2329 1973 2003 2201 2354
Coal Firm Capacity (MW) 1146 608 992 962 763 615
Peak Power Price nreg ($/MWh) 798 -- 802 802 802 802
Offpeak Power Price nreg  ($/MWh) 40 -- 40 40 40 40
Peak Power Price reg  ($/MWh) -- 804 802 802 802 802
Offpeak Power Price reg  ($/MWh) -- 75 90 90 90 86
Demand Weighted Price nreg  ($/MWh) 75 -- 82 83 88 89
Demand Weighted Price reg  ($/MWh) -- 107 115 115 115 113
Peak Demand nreg  (MWh) 3036 -- 2966 2965 2964 2968
Offpeak Demand nreg  (MWh) 595 -- 595 595 595 595
Peak Demand reg  (MWh) -- 2937 2966 2965 2964 2968
Offpeak Demand reg  (MWh) -- 574 564 564 564 567
Gas Firm Peak Output nreg  (MWh) 1890 -- 1973 2003 2201 2354
Gas Firm Offpeak Output nreg  (MWh) 0 -- 0 0 0 0
Coal Firm Peak Output nreg  (MWh) 1146 -- 992 962 763 615
Coal Firm Offpeak Output nreg  (MWh) 595 -- 595 595 595 595
Gas Firm Peak Output reg  (MWh) -- 2329 1973 2003 2201 2354
Gas Firm Offpeak Output reg  (MWh) -- 0 146 564 0 0
Coal Firm Peak Output reg  (MWh) -- 608 992 962 763 642
Coal Firm Offpeak Output reg  (MWh) -- 574 419 0 564 567
Gas Firm Permit Purchase (million tons/yr) -- 2.03 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.98
Coal Firm Permit Purchase (million tons/yr) -- 5.30 5.37 5.37 5.37 5.35
Permit Price ($/ton) -- 35 50 50 50 45.71
Gas Firm Profit nreg  (million $/yr) 0 -- 4.9 5.0 5.7 5.7
Coal Firm Profit nreg  (million $/yr) 0 -- 62.0 68.4 99.2 85.7
Gas Firm Profit reg  (million $/yr) -- 0 -4.9 -5.0 -5.4 -5.1
Coal Firm Profit reg  (million $/yr) -- 0 -62.0 -60.1 -47.6 -27.7
Gas Firm Utility nreg -- -- -- 0.0 0.0 0.1
Coal Firm Utility nreg -- -- -- 0.1 0.4 0.6
Gas Firm Utility reg -- -- -- 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Coal Firm Utility reg -- -- -- -0.1 -0.3 -0.3
Gas Firm Expected utility -- -- -- 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal Firm Expected utility -- -- -- 0.0 0.1 0.1
Gas Firm Certainty Equivalent (thousand $/yr) -- -- -- 12.5 75.7 144.0
Coal Firm Certainty Equivalent (million $/yr) -- -- -- 2.1 12.6 14.2
Gas Firm Emissions nreg (million ton/yr) 0.53 -- 0.79 0.86 1.50 2.09
Coal Firm Emissions nreg  (million ton/yr) 8.63 -- 8.03 7.88 6.55 5.37
Gas Firm Emissions reg  (million ton/yr) -- 2.03 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.98
Coal Firm Emissions reg  (million ton/yr) -- 5.30 5.37 5.37 5.37 5.35
Total Emissions nreg  (million ton/yr) 9.2 -- 8.8 8.7 8.1 7.5
Total Emissions reg  (million ton/yr) -- 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
Producer Surplus nreg  (million $/yr) 0.0 -- 66.9 73.4 104.8 93.2
Producer Surplus reg  (million $/yr) -- 0.0 -66.9 -65.1 -53.0 -32.8
Consumer Surplus nreg  (billion $/yr) 4.48 -- 4.41 4.40 4.35 4.34
Consumer Surplus reg  (billion $/yr) -- 4.18 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.13
Social Welfare nreg  (billion $/yr) 4.48 -- 4.48 4.48 4.46 4.44
Social Welfare reg  (billion $/yr) -- 4.43 4.41 4.41 4.42 4.43
Deterministic Model Stochastic Model
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Table 4: Example of  solutions found with 80% emission cap,  
grandfathering allowances (allocation rule II) in a competitive market 
 
 
 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7
Regulation Environment/Risk Attitude Baseline Regulation Neutral 1x10
-9
5x10
-9
1x10
-8
Gas Firm Capacity (MW) 1890 2329 1973 1945 1850 1827
Coal Firm Capacity (MW) 1146 608 992 1021 1118 1143
Peak Power Price nreg ($/MWh) 798 -- 802 802 802 802
Offpeak Power Price nreg  ($/MWh) 40 -- 40 40 40 40
Peak Power Price reg  ($/MWh) -- 804 802 802 802 802
Offpeak Power Price reg  ($/MWh) -- 75 90 90 90 90
Demand Weighted Price nreg  ($/MWh) 75 -- 82 81 77 75
Demand Weighted Price reg  ($/MWh) -- 107 115 115 115 115
Peak Demand nreg  (MWh) 3036 -- 2966 2966 2968 2970
Offpeak Demand nreg  (MWh) 595 -- 595 595 595 595
Peak Demand reg  (MWh) -- 2937 2966 2966 2968 2970
Offpeak Demand reg  (MWh) -- 574 564 564 564 564
Gas Firm Peak Output nreg  (MWh) 1890 -- 1973 1945 1850 1827
Gas Firm Offpeak Output nreg  (MWh) 0 -- 0 0 0 0
Coal Firm Peak Output nreg  (MWh) 1146 -- 992 1021 1118 1143
Coal Firm Offpeak Output nreg  (MWh) 595 -- 595 595 595 595
Gas Firm Peak Output reg  (MWh) -- 2329 1973 1945 1850 1827
Gas Firm Offpeak Output reg  (MWh) -- 0 531 559 511 0
Coal Firm Peak Output reg  (MWh) -- 608 992 1021 1118 1143
Coal Firm Offpeak Output reg  (MWh) -- 574 33 5 53 564
Gas Firm Permit Purchase (million tons/yr) -- 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Coal Firm Permit Purchase (million tons/yr) -- -1.6 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5
Permit Price ($/ton) -- 35 50 50 50 50
Gas Firm Profit nreg  (million $/yr) 0 -- 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.3
Coal Firm Profit nreg  (million $/yr) 0 -- 62.0 50.7 19.5 4.9
Gas Firm Profit reg  (million $/yr) -- 14.9 16.4 16.4 16.6 16.5
Coal Firm Profit reg  (million $/yr) -- 242 283 281 275 274
Gas Firm Utility nreg -- -- -- 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal Firm Utility nreg -- -- -- 0.0 0.1 0.0
Gas Firm Utility reg -- -- -- 0.0 0.1 0.2
Coal Firm Utility reg -- -- -- 0.2 0.7 0.9
Gas Firm Expected utility -- -- -- 0.0 0.1 0.1
Coal Firm Expected utility -- -- -- 0.1 0.4 0.5
Gas Firm Certainty Equivalent (thousand $/yr) -- -- -- 10.6 10.4 10.2
Coal Firm Certainty Equivalent (million $/yr) -- -- -- 159.0 109.0 67.6
Gas Firm Emissions nreg (million ton/yr) 0.5 -- 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
Coal Firm Emissions nreg  (million ton/yr) 8.6 -- 8.0 8.2 8.5 8.6
Gas Firm Emissions reg  (million ton/yr) -- 2.03 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96
Coal Firm Emissions reg  (million ton/yr) -- 5.30 5.37 5.37 5.37 5.37
Total Emissions nreg  (million ton/yr) 9.2 -- 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.2
Total Emissions reg  (million ton/yr) -- 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
Producer Surplus nreg  (million $/yr) 0.0 -- 67.0 55.5 24.0 9.2
Producer Surplus reg  (million $/yr) -- 256.5 299.5 297.7 291.7 290.0
Consumer Surplus nreg  (billion $/yr) 4.5 -- 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5
Consumer Surplus reg  (billion $/yr) -- 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
Social Welfare nreg  (billion $/yr) 4.5 -- 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Social Welfare reg  (billion $/yr) -- 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
Deterministic Model Stochastic Model
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Table 5: Example of  solutions found with 80% emission cap,  
grandfathering allowances (allocation rule I) in a competitive market 
 
 
 
  
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7
Regulation Environment/Risk Attitude Baseline Regulation Neutral 1x10
-9
5x10
-9
1x10
-8
Gas Firm Capacity (MW) 1890 2329 1973 1969 1941 1913
Coal Firm Capacity (MW) 1146 608 992 1002 1051 1099
Peak Power Price nreg ($/MWh) 798 -- 802 802 801 799
Offpeak Power Price nreg  ($/MWh) 40 -- 40 40 40 40
Peak Power Price reg  ($/MWh) -- 804 802 802 801 799
Offpeak Power Price reg  ($/MWh) -- 75 90 90 90 90
Demand Weighted Price nreg  ($/MWh) 75 -- 82 81 80 78
Demand Weighted Price reg  ($/MWh) -- 107 115 115 115 115
Peak Demand nreg  (MWh) 3036 -- 2966 2971 2992 3012
Offpeak Demand nreg  (MWh) 595 -- 595 595 595 595
Peak Demand reg  (MWh) -- 2937 2966 2971 2992 3012
Offpeak Demand reg  (MWh) -- 574 564 564 564 564
Gas Firm Peak Output nreg  (MWh) 1890 -- 1973 1969 1941 1913
Gas Firm Offpeak Output nreg  (MWh) 0 -- 0 0 0 0
Coal Firm Peak Output nreg  (MWh) 1146 -- 992 1002 1051 1099
Coal Firm Offpeak Output nreg  (MWh) 595 -- 595 595 595 595
Gas Firm Peak Output reg  (MWh) -- 2329 1973 1969 1941 1913
Gas Firm Offpeak Output reg  (MWh) -- 0 0 130 146 0
Coal Firm Peak Output reg  (MWh) -- 608 992 1002 1051 1099
Coal Firm Offpeak Output reg  (MWh) -- 574 564 434 419 564
Gas Firm Permit Purchase (million tons/yr) -- -1.3 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.3
Coal Firm Permit Purchase (million tons/yr) -- 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3
Permit Price ($/ton) -- 35 50 50 50 50
Gas Firm Profit nreg  (million $/yr) 0.0 -- 4.9 4.5 3.1 1.7
Coal Firm Profit nreg  (million $/yr) 0.0 -- 62.0 58.0 42.0 24.4
Gas Firm Profit reg  (million $/yr) -- 116.0 161.0 160.0 159.0 158.0
Coal Firm Profit reg  (million $/yr) -- 141.0 139.0 138.0 134.0 130.0
Gas Firm Utility nreg -- -- -- 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal Firm Utility nreg -- -- -- 0.1 0.2 0.2
Gas Firm Utility reg -- -- -- 0.1 0.5 0.8
Coal Firm Utility reg -- -- -- 0.1 0.5 0.7
Gas Firm Expected utility -- -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.4
Coal Firm Expected utility -- -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.5
Gas Firm Certainty Equivalent (thousand $/yr) -- -- 79.4 66.2 51.9
Coal Firm Certainty Equivalent (million $/yr) -- -- 97.2 82.8 64.0
Gas Firm Emissions nreg (million ton/yr) 0.5 -- 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6
Coal Firm Emissions nreg  (million ton/yr) 8.6 -- 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.5
Gas Firm Emissions reg  (million ton/yr) -- 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Coal Firm Emissions reg  (million ton/yr) -- 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
Total Emissions nreg  (million ton/yr) 9.2 -- 8.8 8.9 9.0 9.1
Total Emissions reg  (million ton/yr) -- 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
Producer Surplus nreg  (million $/yr) 0.0 -- 67.0 62.5 45.1 26.1
Producer Surplus reg  (million $/yr) -- 256.5 299.5 298.4 293.2 288.1
Consumer Surplus nreg  (billion $/yr) 4.5 -- 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5
Consumer Surplus reg  (billion $/yr) -- 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
Deterministic Model Stochastic Model
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Appendix 1: Multi-period demand function parameters 
The inverse demand function in the cap-and-trade scheme, multi-period definition model is de-
fined as: 
ije
ij ij ij
ij
p d                 (28) 
where the value for the parameters Φij‘s and Ψij‘s are defined as: 
 
Φij = 1000; Ψij   as in Table A1: 
 
Table A1: Demand function parameter assumptions 
 
Ψi1 Ψi2 Ψi3 Ψi4  Ψi5 Ψi6 Ψi7 Ψi8 
15000 3500 2600 2200 2000 1750 1650 1550 
Ψi 9 Ψi,10 Ψi,11 Ψi,12 Ψi,13 Ψi,14 Ψi,15 Ψi,16 
1450 1375 1200 1250 1200 1160 1120 1080 
Ψi,17 Ψi,18 Ψi,19 Ψi,20 Ψi,21 Ψi,22 Ψi,23 Ψi,24 
1050 1010 980 940 900 850 780 620 
 
